On July 1, 2026, the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated two Brazilian nationals, three Brazilian companies, and one Portugal-based company for their alleged role in laundering drug proceeds on behalf of the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), which Treasury now calls the largest transnational criminal organization in the Western Hemisphere.
The individuals named are Victor Henrique de Oliveira Shimada and Stella Stefanie Nunes Henrique de Oliveira. Treasury describes Shimada as the head of a São Paulo-based laundering cell that served as the link between PCC operatives in Florida and drug traffickers abroad, moving more than $30 million in illicit proceeds out of the U.S. and back into Brazil using cryptocurrency. Stella, described as his relative and associate, is accused of acting as his secretary and as an intermediary for bulk cash pickups.
The companies designated — Victory Trading Intermediação de Negócios, Cobranças e Tecnologia Ltda, Pixwave Soluções de Pagamentos Ltda, and Wave Construções Inteligentes Ltda, all based in São Paulo, plus Avenidas Flutuantes Unipessoal Lda in Portugal — were named on the grounds that they are owned, controlled by, or acted on behalf of Shimada.
The action was taken under Executive Order 14059 (illicit drug trafficking) and E.O. 13224, as amended (terrorism financing), and follows a Homeland Security Task Force investigation involving the FBI's Miami Field Office and the Justice Department's Money Laundering, Narcotics and Forfeiture Section. It is OFAC's third action against PCC-linked targets, after the designation of PCC itself as an organization in December 2021 and of operative Diego Macedo Gonçalves do Carmo in March 2024 — but the first since the State Department designated PCC and Comando Vermelho as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists in May 2026.
The Brazilian real weakened roughly 1% against the dollar the day the sanctions were announced, though market reaction has so far been limited given the modest dollar amounts involved relative to Brazil's financial system.
Brazilian Police Say the Sanctions Backfired
Two days after the Treasury announcement, on July 3, Federal Police (PF) Director-General Andrei Rodrigues said the U.S. move forced his agency to accelerate a long-planned operation — and may have cost investigators the chance to capture one of the suspects.
Rodrigues said the PF's own investigation into Shimada and Stella predated the American sanctions and was not triggered by them; a request of this scale, he noted, "cannot be built overnight." But he confirmed that the public disclosure of the sanctions altered the operation's timeline, forcing police to move up the execution of search and arrest warrants under "Operação Exchange." He did not disclose specifics, citing the confidentiality of the investigation, but acknowledged the change may have undercut some of the operation's objectives.
The operation was carried out on the morning of July 3 in São Paulo, Santos, Praia Grande, and Santana de Parnaíba, executing 11 temporary arrest warrants and 13 search-and-seizure warrants tied to allegations of money laundering, currency evasion, and criminal association linked to PCC members. Seven people were arrested. Courts also ordered the seizure of assets, funds, and cryptoassets from those investigated totaling roughly R$10.4 billion (about $1.9 billion). Shimada himself remains a fugitive.
Rodrigues was blunt in his assessment of Washington's approach, calling the U.S. terrorist designation of PCC and Comando Vermelho a "grotesque error" and a "mistaken decision," arguing that Brazil already has its own strategy for confronting the factions and does not need the American framework to do so.
The Cooperation Question
As we noted when the terrorist designation was first announced in May, one of the more consequential — if less visible — effects of classifying PCC and Comando Vermelho as terrorist organizations is a structural shift in how U.S. agencies approach cooperation with Brazil. Leading anti-organized-crime prosecutor Lincoln Gakiya has argued that the designation moves the issue out of a purely law-enforcement framework and into one of national defense, shifting primary ownership within the U.S. government away from the FBI and DEA and toward the CIA and the military.
This week's episode offers an early, concrete illustration of the friction that shift can create. Even without any direct U.S. operational involvement on Brazilian soil, the mere publication of a Treasury sanctions list — a routine OFAC action under normal circumstances — collided with an active PF investigation, forced Brazilian police to improvise, and by their own account, let a fugitive escape capture. If future actions involve tighter coordination, or none at all, Brazilian authorities may find themselves increasingly forced to react to Washington's timeline rather than set their own.
For international companies and financial institutions, the episode is also a reminder that this new sanctions program is live and moving quickly: Victory Trading, Pixwave, and Wave are now on the SDN list, and any U.S. person or foreign financial institution dealing with them — or with entities 50% or more owned by the sanctioned individuals — faces the same blocking and secondary-sanctions exposure detailed in our earlier coverage of the terrorist designation.














